



LANGUAGE AS A FORM OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR1 
EDWARD SAPIR 
So long as the facts of speech are discussed only by students 
professionally interested in language its peculiar characteristics are 
very likely to be overlooked. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
philologists and teachers of particular languages are apt to have 
vaguer and cruder notions of the fundamental characteristics of 
human speech than such unspecialized students of human behavior 
as concern themselves with this most human of all reactive systems. 
It is clear that if we are ever to relate the fundamental problems of 
linguistic science to those of human behavior in general— in other 
words, to psychology—we must learn to see language as possessed 
of certain essential characteristics apart from those of particular 
languages that we may happen to be familiar with and as rooted in 
some general soil of behavior that gives birth to other than strictly 
linguistic forms of expression. 
If we take a bird's-eye view of the languages of the world we 
find that there are certain things that characterize them as a whole 
and that tend to mark them off somewhat from other forms of cul-
tural behavior. In the first place we are struck by the marvelous 
completeness of formal development of each and every language 
that we have knowledge of. Popular opinion to the contrary, there is 
no known language, whether spoken by a culturally advanced 
1 An address delivered before the joint session of the National Council of Teachers of 
English and the English Language Congress at Philadelphia, November, 1926. 
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group or by one of the more backward peoples of the world, which 
has not its perfectly definite phonetic system, its clearly developed 
and often very complex system of forms, and its established rules 
and idioms of usage. In other words, there is no such thing as a 
language that has not its well-defined grammar, though it goes with-
out saying that this grammatical system is never consciously known 
or capable of communication by the untutored folk. We may further 
say of all normal forms of human speech that they have the 
appearance of systems of behavior that are rather definitely marked 
off from all other organizations within the general range of conduct. 
When we deal with such flexible categories of socialized behavior as 
religion or art or government or education, it is difficult to draw 
convincing lines. A given reaction may be placed now here, now 
there, but there seems never to be any reasonable doubt as to the 
formal identity of a speech act. This is all the more remarkable as 
speech is not in actual life handled as a self-satisfying reactive sys-
tem. It comes into use and consciousness merely as a general lever 
for all types of expression. There is no pure linguistic conduct. 
There is only conduct in which the need is felt for communication 
or expression and in which this need is solved with the help of an 
elaborate linguistic apparatus, always ready to hand. 
We are learning to attribute more and more importance to the 
part played by the unconscious mind in the development of our 
habits. We realize more clearly than the psychologists and philoso-
phers of the past have realized that the consciously controlled type 
of behavior is always a secondary type, and that all intellectual 
formulations are little more than a conscious control, in set terms, 
of knowledge that is already possessed in an unconscious or intui-
tive form. It is characteristic of the more important types of so-
cialized conduct that they tend to draw the attention of individuals 
and societies to themselves and thus become an object of conscious 
formulation—in other words, of scientific study. It does not follow, 
however, that a scientific statement of facts, say of religion or other 
aspects of social conduct, is more accurate or more delicately 
nuanced than the intuitive knowledge and control which preceded 
it. One may have, and often does have, an astonishing fineness of 
intuitive control without being in the least possessed of an even 
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elementary knowledge of the reactive system as such. Hence it is 
not surprising that statements made by sophisticated, no less than 
by more naive, people about their own forms of speech and about 
the nature of their linguistic responses are often wide of the mark. It 
is well known that Plato indulged in extraordinarily childish 
speculations on the nature of the Greek language. 
We must, therefore, carefully refrain from making the common 
mistake of confusing the intuitively felt complexities of language 
with an intellectually controlled statement of them. If we do not 
learn to make this important distinction we shut ourselves off from 
the possibility of understanding the marvelous formal intricacy of 
so many of the languages of primitive man, and—what is of more 
general interest—of understanding how the child is able to acquire 
as firm and accurate and extended a control of linguistic habits as 
he does. Long before the child knows the difference between a 
singular and a plural, long before he has any notion that there is 
such a thing as tense, he has learned to use the categories of number 
and tense with perfect freedom and comfort. With the development 
of civilization, language has tended more and more to rise into con-
sciousness as a subject of speculation and study; but it still remains 
characteristic of language as a whole that of all the great systems of 
social patterning it is probably the one which is most definitely 
unconscious in its operation. But the unconsciousness of the speech 
processes is not to be interpreted in any vague or mystic sense. All 
that we mean is that our intuitive sense of the relations between 
forms of expression is keen enough to enable us to acquire a full 
control of speech habits without the necessity of an intellectual 
overhauling. The clarity and certainty of this intuitive process is 
best evidenced by the fact that when natives who have never 
learned the grammar of their own language come in contact with a 
field investigator who endeavors to discover this grammar by in-
ductive methods of inquiry, the natives often develop—and in a 
short time—a very real comprehension of what the inquirer is after. 
They can often help him with the statement of explicit rules and 
with observations that could never have occurred to them in the 
normal course of their daily life. 
The next and most obvious of the general features of speech is 
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its indirect or symbolic character. No normal speech utterance re-
ally means what it biologically seems to mean. In other words, if I 
move the lips or tongue or glottal cords in this or that fashion it is 
not because these movements are of any direct use in my adjust-
ment to the environment. It is because by means of these move-
ments I am able to effect articulations that are perceived as arbitrary 
sequences of sounds conveying more or less definite notions which 
stand in no intelligible relation to the articulations themselves. If I 
move my tongue in order to lick a piece of candy I carry out a 
movement which has direct significance for the desired end, but if I 
put my tongue in the position needed to articulate the sound "1" or 
a given vowel, the act is in no way useful except in so far as society 
has tacitly decided that these movements are capable of symbolic 
interpretation. It is highly important to realize that symbolic 
systems, which are systems of indirect function, are not in theory 
confined to speech. One may have a pantomimic symbolic system 
or any other kind of symbolic system developed by some part of the 
organism, but it remains strikingly true that no other human type of 
symbolic behavior compares for a moment in completeness or 
antiquity or universality with the symbolism known as speech. It is 
further important to observe that there seem to be no appreciable 
differences in the languages of the world in regard to their 
relatively symbolic character. The sound sequences that are used as 
symbols of reference by the Hottentot or the Eskimo are to all 
intents and purposes as arbitrary as those used by a modern 
Englishman or Frenchman or German. 
This brings us to what is, in some respects, the most surprising 
fact about language: that, universal as it is, it is at the same time the 
most variable of all human institutions in the actual detail of its 
overt expression. All types of religious belief, all systems of dec-
orative art, all kinship systems, all methods of organizing society 
have certain unmistakable things in common so far as their actual 
content is concerned; but when it comes to speech, which is more 
deeply rooted in human society than any one of these systems of 
activity, we find that its actual content in terms of words, linguistic 
forms, and methods of articulation is almost infinitely variable. We 
must conclude from this that what is fundamentally character- 
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istic of speech at any given time and place is not its overt form, 
which can only be understood as the resultant of a very complicated 
series of historical circumstances, but its ground plan. Languages do 
not profoundly matter. It is the habit of language as such that is of 
such tremendous importance for humanity. The best proof of this is 
the ease with which human beings learn to pass from one language 
to another and the ease with which they transfer from one symbolic 
medium to another—from oral speech to writing, from writing to 
the telegraph code, and so on indefinitely. It comes to this: that 
language cannot be adequately defined as a set of physical habits, 
but must be understood rather as an arrangement, for purposes of 
communication and expression, of all the elements of experience in 
accordance with a complex system of intuitively felt relations that 
can choose any perceptible tokens or symbols they have a mind to. 
So far we have been assuming that the task of language is a 
purely denotive one; that when we say "horse," for instance, our 
sole purpose is to convey a reference to a class of well-known ani-
mals. If we look more closely at what actually happens in human 
speech, however, we are impressed by the fact that the denotive 
function of speech is always compounded with certain expressive 
factors which we are in the habit of leaving out of account in our 
formal designations of linguistic processes, but which are always 
present in the actual life of language. It is impossible to pronounce 
even so indifferent a word as "horse" without a lesser or greater 
show of interest, without some change of emotion. This 
expressiveness may relate to our personal attitude toward horses in 
general or to a particular horse that has been called up as an image 
in our minds. Or very frequently, too, the expressiveness of artic-
ulation may have nothing to do with the animal but may relate to 
our attitude toward the person that we are speaking to or thinking 
of, or to our own general state of mind. In extreme cases our pro-
nunciation of the word "horse" may be infinitely more significant as 
revealing a distracted state of mind or an intense interest in the 
person spoken to than as a pure denotive symbol. It becomes clear 
that in the course of our speech activities we are really doing two 
rather distinct things, though these are never to be completely sun- 
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dered except by a process of abstraction. On the one hand, we are 
using words as algebraic symbols for classes of ideas to which we 
refer certain individual references that we wish to make. On the 
other hand, we are giving some hint of our attitude toward these 
ideas or toward some of the things or persons present in the back-
ground of the speech act. It is because we are alert to the endless 
conflict between the denotive and the expressive aspects of speech 
that we can safely interpret many words or phrases or statements in 
a sense that is completely at variance with their supposed meaning. 
If a man slaps his friend on the back with the remark that he is a 
"rascally dog," he knows very well that his words will not be 
understood to mean what they seem to mean. Again, measured 
words of praise may be so uttered as to amount to an insult. All 
these remarks are commonplaces, but their importance is perhaps 
not sufficiently understood by students of language. We have been 
too successfully schooled by the grammarians and the systematizes 
of speech phenomena to have much charity for these apparently 
dubious or secondary uses of speech. But what if it turned out, in 
the upshot, that these usages are not as secondary as they seem, that 
we have reason to believe that in the remote past, when language 
was beginning to emerge as a symbolic system, its use was even 
more expressive than at present? What if language were merely 
conventionalized gesture—using the word "gesture" in its widest 
possible sense as indicating any form of expression? 
A parallel from an entirely unconnected type of human be-
havior may be useful at this point. If I am very much angered by 
something that one has said or done, I may so forget myself as to 
lunge forward with the obvious intention of hitting him. My reac-
tion would be directly expressive in a functional sense. Now, I may 
inhibit the reaction without entirely destroying its form. There may 
be enough of the gesture left to make it obvious to the bystanders 
that I had had the impulse to strike. This abbreviated or 
rudimentary gesture will then be felt as in some sort a symbol of 
my attitude. But it is an individual symbol which I have created, at 
it were, on the spur of the moment, and which is not to be inter-
preted in accordance with an artificial social code. But suppose, 
further, that this gesture becomes accepted by society at large as a 
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pantomimic symbol of the striking act, then we have what amounts 
to all intents and purposes to an unemotional, denotive symbol of 
the notion of striking. It would then be possible for human beings to 
use such a gesture for purposes of reference only. They would not 
necessarily feel the impulse to strike when they used the pan-
tomimic gesture for it. Now it is, of course, perfectly obvious that 
rudimentary symbolisms of this sort are constantly being created by 
individuals and that they tend to become more or less characteristic 
of our varying social groups, but they have never succeeded in 
elevating themselves to the status of universal symbolisms of ref-
erence. What if speech were, at last analysis, a highly convention-
alized system of just such expressive gestures which by constant 
use had lost their original expressive content, having been rubbed 
down to the status of purely referential symbols? 
In order clearly to understand the point of view that we are 
trying to develop it is necessary to take a glance at human respon-
siveness in general. We shall then be able to put speech in its proper 
perspective, to see it, not as the extraordinarily isolated and peculiar 
thing that it at first seems to be, but as a highly evolved product of a 
type of activity that is far more general in scope. In the case of the 
arrested gesture of striking that we discussed before there was an 
obvious resemblance between the activity that resulted from the 
impulse to strike and the eventually pantomimic symbol built up 
out of it. But a more inclusive observation soon discloses the fact 
that symbols need not arise in quite so simple a manner. 
We are in the habit of looking at all forms of human activity 
from a functional point of view. A man moves his jaws when en-
gaged in the act of eating in order to prepare the food for swallow-
ing. He moves his limbs in order to walk. He strains his eyes in 
order to see more clearly. He lifts his voice in order to reach the 
ears of a distant person. And so on indefinitely. But these obviously 
functional acts by no means constitute the sum total of human 
behavior; it becomes necessary to inquire if a large portion of this 
behavior may not be interpreted in other than strictly functional 
terms. We may return, for purposes of illustration, to the example 
that we gave before. It is perfectly true that the act of 
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lunging forward and of beginning to use the hands is the central fact 
in the response of the angry individual, and is, for that reason, likely 
to be the only one that engages our attention. But it is true to say 
that the whole body participates in the response in some form or 
other. The eyes, the brows, the toes, and any number of other 
organs or systems of organs are involved in the angry response and 
can in a sense be said to help along the central response by a kind of 
sympathetic imitation. In other words, we have reason to believe 
that the particular part of the body that carries out a given act is 
always accompanied by other segments of the organism, which lend 
their consent, as it were, in symbolic form. It is essentially artificial, 
for instance, to think of the expression of wonder as bound up with 
the staring eyes alone. There will be something about the tension of 
the hands and about the whole set of the organism that is in some 
manner corroborative of what the eyes disclose. If, for one reason 
or another, the central expressive organ or system of organs is 
inhibited, the energy of the impulse may concentrate in some other 
part of the organism, so that the secondary expressive symbol may 
become the symbol par excellence. The more highly evolved we 
become as socialized individuals whose business it is to inhibit many 
of our expressive impulses, the more likely it is that these impulses 
find lodgment in parts of the organism that were not primarily 
designed, so to speak, for such expressions. The facts that I allude 
to are familiar enough, though they are probably rarely seen in their 
true generality. If I cannot box a man on the ear, I can at least 
double my fist behind my back or quietly stick out my tongue at 
him when he is not looking. These are merely overemphasized 
symbols of a type which are present in embryo in the natural 
consummation of the striking gesture. The tongue darts forward as a 
functionally ineffective but symbolically relieving substitute for the 
striking act itself. 
Let us now return to speech. There is no reason to believe that 
speech articulations are different from any other expressions of the 
human body. At moments of intense excitement, when the current 
patterns of society fall away from us, the articulatory apparatus is 
very likely to regress into its primitive condition, and we produce 
all kinds of involuntary sounds that are highly expressive of our 
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emotions or impulses. In ordinary life these emotions and impulses 
merely color speech, which has come to be an essentially denotive 
system. But we may surmise that in the remote past speech was 
neither more nor less than a series of auditory gestures, directly 
symbolizing various types of adjustment to the environment. These 
auditory gestures would have arisen, then, as substitutive symbols 
for activities or other expressions which it was not possible or con-
venient to effect at the time. Thus, one's natural impulse in describ-
ing a large object is to move the arms in a more or less circular 
fashion suggesting the notion of bigness. According to the theory 
that we are now developing, other parts of the organism would be 
expressing the notion of bigness in other and more indirect ways. 
The speech apparatus would help along in the expressive symbolism 
by parting the lips, dropping the tongue as low as possible, rounding 
the lips, sinking the pitch of the voice, and in other ways. If anyone 
is inclined to doubt the reality of such involuntary symbolisms in 
speech, let him try the following experiment, which I have myself 
tried a number of times with practically 100 per cent success. Let 
him tell a number of people, or a class, that there are three 
imaginary words: "la" (rhyming with "pa"), "law," and "lee," all 
meaning "table," but with a connotation of difference of size. Let 
them then tell which of these three hypothetical words indicates the 
big table, which the little table, and which the middle-sized table. I 
think it will be found that the normal English-speaking person, or 
French-speaking person, for that matter, will think of "lee" as 
symbolizing the small table, "law" the big table, and "la" the 
middle-sized table or table par excellence. This simply means that 
even at this late day we have not lost the feeling for the gesture 
significance of sounds and combinations of sounds. If we examine 
these three imaginary words more closely from the phonetic point of 
view, we find that the responses are well justified. The 
pronunciation of the vowel "ee" of "lee" is such as to demand a 
shortening of the distance between the tongue and the roof of the 
mouth, as contrasted with the pronunciation of the "a" of "la," in 
which the tongue articulates lower and farther back. Similarly, in 
"law" the tongue drops still more, the lower jaw also drops a little, 
and there is a slight tendency toward lip rounding. These phonetic 
430 THE ENGLISH JOURNAL 
modifications amount to gestures, the "ee" gesture being in effect 
an expressive symbol for smallness, the "aw" gesture a similarly 
expressive symbol for bigness. 
All that is claimed here is that if we see sound articulations as 
highly variable and intuitively intelligible symbolic gestures, we 
have all we need to explain the phenomenon we call speech. The 
precise how and when and where of the historical development of 
speech is of course another matter. We must assume that speech 
expressiveness was highly variable, in an individual sense, to begin 
with; that only very slowly and painfully did groups of individuals 
come to look upon certain of these symbols as possessing a fixed 
symbolic significance; that once an expressive symbolism had been 
fixed by social habit, it could lose its expressive content and take 
on a denotive one, as in the case of the pantomimic gesture we dis-
cussed before; and that, finally, owing to the changes, unconscious 
and ceaseless, which set in to blur the original outlines of any social 
pattern of conduct, the actual sounds used for any symbol of ref-
erence would in course of time depart so widely from their original 
form as to obscure the whole mechanism of gesture symbolism 
which gave rise to the speech process in the first place. It should be 
carefully noted that this theory of the nature and development of 
speech is only superficially similar to the older interjectional and 
onomatopoetic theories of speech which used to be current in lin-
guistic circles. If our view of the nature of speech is correct, it 
follows that the denotive function of speech, which we now con-
ceive to be its primary function, is in actual fact a secondary one, 
just as it is a secondary fact that one shakes one's fist at an enemy, 
not in order to initiate the act of striking, but to indicate in a pic-
turesquely symbolic manner that one has no use for him and might 
punch him soundly under appropriate circumstances. It may be 
suggested at this point that students of speech psychology could 
hardly do better than work out experiments intended to test to what 
extent imaginary speech forms can be constructed that are capable 
of intuitive interpretation in a primary symbolic sense. We see that 
language, in short, has embodied two distinct strata of symbolic 
expression, a primary gesture symbolism and a secondary 
referential one which has largely swamped the former. We 
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can, therefore, see why it is that all normal speech involves a con-
flict between, or intertwining of, two distinct strata of expression or 
types of mechanism, one of which has to do with direct expression, 
the other with indirect or denotive expression. 
It is legitimate to ask why language, a system of articulated and 
perceived sounds, is the one kind of symbolic system that all human 
beings have developed in the course of cultural evolution. I believe 
that the answer is not difficult to find. Most of the available parts of 
the human organism are in constant demand for directly functional 
purposes. This was even more true in the earliest stages of human 
development than today. The muscles of the hands and feet were 
too busily engaged in grasping, striking, walking, running, 
climbing, and other directly useful activities to make it possible for 
a successful symbolism to develop with their aid alone. The case 
was different with the so-called "organs of speech." The primary 
purpose of these organs, which include the larynx (more 
particularly the glottal cords), the nose, the palate, the tongue, the 
teeth, and the lips, is respiration, smelling, and the handling of food, 
of which the first and the last are by far the most important. 
Respiration is so nearly automatic a type of behavior that any 
symbolisms that might be secondarily worked out with the help of 
the larynx, the nose, and the mouth would interfere with it to only a 
slight extent. The chewing and swallowing of food is far less 
automatic, but occurs so seldom in actual practice that the organs 
needed for these important acts are most of the time left free for 
secondary activities. In other words, they are in a strategic position 
for the development of just such secondary symbolisms as we have 
shown were within the reach of all other parts of the organism as 
well. If this is true, speech is what it is, not because there is a mystic 
connection between articulated sounds and thought, or the process 
of symbolization, but merely because the general tendency of the 
human body to develop symbolic modes of expression over and 
above the directly functional ones found favorable soil in the tract 
known as the "organs of speech." An individual who does not need 
to earn his living by the constant use of his fingers for primary 
purposes may develop great virtuosity as a pianist. In precisely the 
same way the organs of speech developed 
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special social virtuosity as symbol executants because they were 
idle enough of the time to make such a luxury possible. 
The two aspects of speech, expressive and referential, are rarely 
seen in their purity. In the workaday world they are constantly 
intertwining their functions in countless compromises, and it is this 
highly variable process of compromise that is so largely responsible 
for the misunderstandings and clashes of human contact. If words 
really meant what we say they mean, there should be little room for 
misunderstandings; but it is of course only too true that they rarely 
mean quite what in our moments of intellectual isolation we claim 
as their due significance, but that they convey thousands of 
connotations over and above this ostensible meaning of theirs. Now, 
it is clear that with the growth of the power of analysis there is an 
ever increasing demand for the development of a perfectly objective 
and unemotional set of symbols that can stay put and mean exactly 
what they are supposed to mean—no more, no less. The more exact 
a system of thought becomes, the more impatient it is apt to be with 
the rough-and-ready symbolisms of normal speech. Hence it is not 
surprising that the mathematical disciplines have been driven to 
invent a great many special symbols which can be defined with 
complete accuracy and which will allow no room for expressive 
modifications. A plus sign that left any room for doubt as to its 
meaning would be useless. But language as ordinarily handled by 
society is soaked with overtones or connotations that are nicely felt 
by the members of the particular society that makes use of one of its 
specific forms, but that it is difficult to convey to outsiders. One 
may know the vocabulary and the grammar of a foreign language 
ever so well, but one is not likely to use it with that unconscious 
appeal to the expressive values that attach to those words and forms 
unless one has spent a considerable time among the people who use 
it or unless one as a child is very much more impressionable to 
these values than we adults normally are. 
Language would be a poorer thing than it is if it were a deno-
tive system alone. But we must not be so sentimental as to overlook 
the equally obvious fact that it is precisely the expressiveness of 
particular languages that makes any one of them a misleading or 
even a dangerous tool for the problem of sheer reference. The 
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necessity of evolving a complicated denotive symbolism that is 
absolutely, or so far as may be, devoid of expressive values is not 
very keenly felt by normal human beings, but it is more than likely 
that as time goes on this purely speculative need will become more 
and more imperative. International complications, for instance, 
must be avoided at all costs, and there is perhaps no one device 
which would do more to eliminate the subtle misunderstandings 
which arise from the use of language as we ordinarily handle it 
than a system of symbols which are as cold-blooded as those used 
by the mathematicians, but which are inclusive enough to provide 
for every possible kind of communication. We must, then, conceive 
the essential task of an international language to be not so much 
the choosing of this or that particular form of speech, but the crea-
tion of a system of symbols of maximal simplicity and of absolute 
lack of ambiguity. The task of constructing such a system is far 
more difficult than it seems to be at first blush. Esperanto and other 
systems that have been suggested are to an amazing extent little 
more than translations into new terms of old habits of reference, 
the expressive "plus" being always included. One of the great 
tasks of the future may be the creation of such an objective lan-
guage of reference from which every possible nuance of individual 
or social expressiveness has been removed. Perhaps such a system 
is philosophically inconceivable; but the history of mathematical 
and other scientific symbolisms shows clearly that the tendency has 
been toward the creation of just such a system. It goes without say-
ing, however, that a purely denotive language need not and is not in 
the least likely to supersede the actual languages in use today, with 
their bewildering flexibility of individual and social expressiveness. 
These are likely to remain for incalculable periods to come. 
